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Introduction
The increase of inequality during the transition appears particularly large in Russia
compared to countries in Central and Eastern Europe.1 The economic recovery, on the
other hand, has been retarded. As a result of high inequality and depressed real incomes,
poverty has become widespread. These two facts—high and rising inequality and
protracted transitional recession—appear to be linked in the perception of the Russian
transition by many scholars.2 Many of these perceptions are based on a stark contrast
between the high inequality in Russia and moderate levels of inequality observed in more
successful transition economies.
The magnitude of the inequality increase in Russia remains perplexing and demand
explanation. Very often the comparison of inequality across countries in transition
overlooks differences in their size, geography and heterogeneity within the units that are
being compared. Russia with its climatic, ethnic and economic variety stands to have a
higher underlying level of inequality than more homogeneous countries, and the direct
comparison of its inequality to other countries is therefore not very informative.
This paper looks closely at the contribution of regional variations to the overall inequality
in Russia. In contrast to previous studies on the subject, which relied on small-scale survey
data,3 this paper uses data from the regionally representative Russian Household Budget
Survey (HBS) over 1994-2000, and therefore provides a full regional extended time
coverage.4 The share of inequality due to differences in mean real incomes across regions
is found to represent one-third of the total inequality in Russia—significantly more than in
any country in Europe. The paper also finds that the increase in national inequality between
1994 and 2000 can be mostly accounted for by increasing interregional inequality. But, still
at least two-thirds of the total inequality in Russia at any point in time is accounted for by
inequality of within-region distributions.
Having established that inequality in real incomes across Russian regions is indeed a key
driving force behind the increase of the inequality at the national level, the paper focuses
on two particular questions. How and why have Russian regions become increasingly
diverse in their mean real incomes? And what determines the evolution of inequality within
regions?
                                                
1 As reported in Milanovic (1999a), Gini coefficient in Russia increased from 0.22 to 0.48 between 1989 and
1995, in contrast to 0.26 to 0.36 increase in Poland over the same time period. World Bank (2000) and
Förster et al. (2003) confirm this conclusion.
2 See, for example the review in Campos and Coricelli (2000).
3 Such as Commander et al. (1999) and Förster et al. (2003) for Russia.
4 Kolenikov and Shorrocks (2003) used HBS data for only one year, 1995, to study the underlying factors of
poverty and inequality at the level of regions; Fedorov (2002) used only data on money incomes.2
The first question boils down to a known problem of convergence. A convergence
framework can be applied to countries, or regions, to see whether over time there is a
tendency for them to converge at income levels. The simple convergence model overlooks,
however, complex dynamics across the entire distribution, and several studies have looked
at the issue of convergence through a mobility analysis which takes into account the full
spectrum of distribution. Researchers have applied either the first5 or second6 approach to
study interregional inequality in Russia. However, the existing studies rely on a rather poor
welfare indicator,7 and a systematic study combining both approaches is not yet available.
Despite data limitations, this paper concludes that there is no apparent tendency towards
convergence, especially for the latter period under study (1997-2000). The transition
matrix approach suggests emerging divergence across regions, with the poor regions
staying poor or getting even poorer, and the rich regions getting richer.
The second question—whether regions increasingly look alike in their internal distribution
of incomes—receives an affirmative answer. The paper applies a test for inequality
convergence8 to Russian regional data and finds statistically significant, albeit slow,
convergence in regional levels of inequality towards a common (and high) level. Based on
this finding, the paper argues that the future of the poverty dynamics in Russia is
determined by the interregional inequality. As the inequality is found to be a very
significant factor of poverty dynamics in Russia,9 the issue of economic divergence across
Russian regions has far-reaching social and political consequences. Observed differences
between regions in their current levels of inequality can be interpreted as deviations from a
common level of inequality, determined by the fundamental market forces. But it is
important to establish what explains these deviations, and this is what the last part of this
paper attempts to do.
The paper is organized into four sections. The first section briefly presents data and
reviews basic trends for poverty and inequality for the country as a whole and its regions.
The second section applies decomposition techniques to inequality at the national level and
establishes trends in regional levels of inequality and regional real incomes, and their
implications for poverty. The third section attempts to disentangle key factors behind
variables and uneven changes in inequality across Russian regions. The fourth section
concludes. To sum up, the first part of this paper distils the data on regional inequality
                                                
5 Mikheeva (1999); Carluer and Sharipova (2001).
6 Dolinskaya (2002).
7 They use CPI to deflate the nominal money incomes to constant prices to a base year. This approach
overlooks the poor quality of regional CPI data in Russia, especially for the earlier years, and/or assumes the
equality of price levels across regions at a base point. We apply a robust measure which is based on the
regional cost of the minimum subsistence (or poverty) basket as deflator.
8 As developed by Ravallion (2001), based on an initial attempt by Benabou (1996).
9 Shorrocks and Kolenikov (2001).3
from published series, the second attempts to understand the resulting data structure, and
the third brings in additional information to interpret this structure.
1 Data, methodologies and trends
The HBS, conducted by the Russian statistical agency (Goskomstat), has until now
remained relatively unexplored as a source of welfare data in Russia. Given its
unparalleled geographical coverage, it is surprising that published poverty data based on
this source are little used in the economic literature on Russia—in contrast to a widespread
use of similar data sources in other countries (EU, India, Brazil, etc.). This section briefly
presents the context important to the interpretation of such data, by showing trends in
incomes, inflation, poverty, inequality and regional differences in Russia over 1990-2000.
1.1 Data on regional incomes, poverty and inequality
Researchers focusing on poverty and inequality during Russia’s transition have, to a large
extent, relied on the only publicly available micro dataset on household welfare in Russia,
the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS).10 However this dataset, known to
provide nationally representative data, is too small to give regionally representative results
and can, thus, be of only limited use to study the regional determinants of poverty and
inequality. The HBS conducted on a regionally representative sample of close to 50,000
households11 provides an alternative dataset. These data constitute the basis for the
published official series on poverty and inequality in Russia starting in the late 1980s.
However, the primary records of HBS remain unavailable to researchers. Published data,
more exactly, regionally disaggregated poverty data, is the main data source for this paper.
There are significant inconsistencies in the official methodology of compiling national-
level data on inequality and poverty from regional distributions.12 This paper is not aimed
at assessing the peculiarities of such methods applied by Goskomstat, but it is important to
mention here its major drawback, which is, since national-level estimates are produced
with their own methods, they cannot be disaggregated into regional components. The paper
uses results of a consistent method to estimate the national inequality and poverty based on
regional data. This method uses the properties of distribution (lognormal) used by
Goskomstat to adjust the household-level data, and obtains a full set of distribution
parameters from only a limited set of published figures—the method is discussed in detail
                                                
10 More details are provided at the website www.cpc.unc.edu/rlms. A modified RLMS dataset represents
Russia in the Luxembourg Income Study Database www.lisproject.org.
11 The Russian micro census of 1994 was used to completely revamp the sample in 1996 with a specific aim
to achieve regional representativeness.
12 As demonstrated, for example, in Sheviakov and Kiruta (2001).4
in Yemtsov (2003).13 This method also allows the calculation of inequality indices by
region, so far not published by Goskomstat.
1.2 Context: regional trends in nominal incomes in 1985-2000
Even before the economic reform of 1992, Russian regions were characterized by quite
noticeable differences in incomes. These widened by 2000, as shown in Figure 1. To avoid
problems with comparability of price levels over time, all regional average incomes are
expressed in the figure as a ratio to the national mean per capita money income in the
current year.































Regional per capita incomes to national average
1985 per cap money inc to avrg







Note: average weighted by population size. Log scale.
Source: data from Goskomstat (2001).
All dots (each representing one region of Russia) at the beginning of the period (1985)
were in the interval ranging from 0.5 to 2 of national mean incomes (horizontal axis). The
spread has noticeably increased by 2000, and the range between maximum and minimum
incomes per capita extended to 0.25-5 of national mean incomes. Thus, the regions were
drifting clearly apart. Crossing lines represent the national means (=1) for 1985 (vertical)
and 2000 (horizontal). If the interregional inequality is to be measured by the spread, it has
increased noticeably over the transition.
Next, Figure 2 demonstrates very peculiar dynamics of this widening. The figure plots the
change over the period in the relative incomes—with regions with incomes increasing
faster than national means plotted as positive values, and regions with falling incomes
compared to national mean as negative values—against initial position of each region in
                                                
13 The idea behind the estimate is to use the officially published data on poverty by region. Jointly with the
data on regional poverty lines and mean incomes, it gives a parameter of inequality consistent with
Goskomstat derivation of distribution statistics using lognormal function for each region. The regional
distributions are then aggregated back to obtain consistent inequality measures at the national level.5
1985 (on the horizontal axis). All but three regions with initial incomes below the national
average (that is, to the left of the vertical line on Figures 1 and 2) have seen their position
vis-à-vis national mean deteriorate by 2000 (falling below the vertical line on Figure 2).

































Change in Regions' Relative Incomes over 1985-2000 to 1985 values
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Note: Weighted by population. Log scale on horizontal axis.
Source: Computed based on Goskomstat (2000).
Many regions have seen their standing deteriorate very significantly; 25 to 50 per cent. One
region above the national mean in 1985, Moscow, has improved its incomes from just over
35 per cent above the national mean in 1985 to four times the national average. Its move is
represented by an outlier position on the top of the graph. Most of the regions slightly
above the national average in 1985 however, slipped down, or have maintained their
relative position. Interestingly enough, bar Moscow, the number of regions improving their
standing is equal (to three) for regions originally below and above the mean. Figure 2
reveals complex dynamics, suggesting intense reranking. Initial position seems to matter
relatively little in determining the performance over the transition. The conclusion from
Figures 1 and 2, however, has to be cautioned for at least two reasons. First, it does not
take into account the differences in price levels across regions of Russia. Second, it
assumes that incomes of the regions’ populations are measured with the same precision in
1985 as in 2000.14 We will now examine in detail the implications of the first to address
the second problem, and will from now on limit the period of analysis to 1992-2000.
1.3 Regional differences in the cost of living
Noticeable differences in price levels were observed in Russia already in 1985, and they
widened considerably during the inflation which followed price liberalization in early
1992, amounting to some 2,500 per cent in 1992. Inflation declined to 22 per cent in 1996,
to rise again during the crisis of 1998-99, with prices more than doubling between the third
                                                
14 Pretransition series are known to contain significant measurement errors, as documented in Atkinson and
Micklewright (1995).6
quarter of 1998 and the second quarter of 1999. The national price level, as measured by
the consumer price index (CPI) between 1992 and 2001, increased 700 times.
Within this national inflation there were substantial differences across regions. Researchers
working with regional statistics tend to take these differences into account by applying
some form of price index (most often CPI) to the base (1985 or 1991).15 Such an
adjustment, however, overlooks the fact that already in 1992 regions had very different
price levels. The only way to correct for these is to take into account differences in the cost
of a fixed basket of goods. In Russia this widely accepted fixed basket of goods has existed
since 1992 as an official national poverty line based on a subsistence minimum (referred to
as the minimum subsistence income or MSI).16 Over the period under study, the cost of the
minimum subsistence basket per capita rose from RR635 in January 1992 to RR379,000 in
December 1996, and then increased further to 908 new rubles17 by the end of 1999
(RR908,000 in old rubles)—more than a thousandfold increase. Most importantly, the
costs of this basket were monitored and reported regionally during 1992-2000.18
Figure 3 plots regional poverty lines in 1985 against 2000. To maintain consistency with
previous figures, the values used are regional poverty lines divided by the national average
poverty line for the corresponding year, and the figure uses the same scaling options.
Figure 3 shows that there has been already a very high differentiation of regional living
costs in 1992, and these differences, though narrowing somewhat over time, have not
dwindled much by 2000. Therefore an obvious solution to achieve comparability of
welfare measure across regions is to take a ratio of nominal regional incomes to the current
cost of MSI. Methodological and measurement issues related to the adaptation of such a
measure are fully discussed in Yemtsov (2003).
This paper uses regional money incomes divided by the regional poverty lines as a welfare
indicator.19 The alternative welfare indicator used in the literature—based on regional CPI
                                                
15 Example of such an approach is Mikheeva (1999).
16 The basis for establishing a poverty basket, or MSI, was a presidential decree on 2 March 1992. This
decree allowed preparation of the official guidelines for region-specific baskets by the labour ministry
published on 10 November 1992. These guidelines remained unchanged until the first quarter of 2000, when
new methodology was introduced. This methodology itself takes its origin in a federal law of 24 October
1997 (No. 134) and the corresponding guidelines issued by the labour ministry  and Goskomstat on 28 April
2000 (No. 36/34).
17 The redenomination in January 1998 lopped off three zeros from the Russian currency. The government
took elaborate precautions to ensure the population’s confidence in the new currency with the old ruble notes
circulating alongside the new ones for the whole of 1997. The old notes were exchangeable for the new
currency until 1 January 2002.
18 Note that the composition of the basket varies across six climatic zones, and cannot be judged as a fully
fixed bundle. The analysis in this paper assumes that these regional differences in the composition of the
basket does not represent differences in the utility levels, and take into account only differences in local tastes
and climatic conditions.
19 Money incomes may seem somewhat an inferior indicator of living standards especially in the presence of
significant in-kind components of consumption. However, money income is the only welfare index defined7
indices with a base of 100 in 1992—give quite different results, as the cost of the CPI
basket differs significantly from the cost of a basket of food items consumed by the poor.
This difference has to be kept in mind while comparing results presented in this paper with
other studies.
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Note: Average weighted by population size. Log scale.
Source: Goskomstat (various).
1.4 Regional real per capita incomes between 1992 and 2000
Adjusting incomes by the regional differences in the cost of living substantially enriches
the story on the regional dynamics of living standards. Figure 4 shows the regional
variation of incomes per capita divided by the corresponding poverty lines, expressed as a
ratio to all-Russia means for 1992 and 2000. All scaling conventions of previous figures
are retained. Unlike the graph on relative nominal incomes, this one shows more dispersion
across regions and significant reranking in region position vis-à-vis national average. The
regions form a cloud rather than a line, but there is no sign of convergence or divergence
prima facie, in that poorer regions are not necessarily catching up or increasingly lagging
behind. The figure suggests seemingly chaotic movement in all directions. Most of such
action happened in the middle of the distribution. It is also clear that the position of the
region at the start of transition does not seem to have predetermined its performance by the
year 2000. Figure 4 captures regions at the start of transition and eight years later. Such a
comparison does not fully capture movements between the extreme points in time. The
period of 1992-2000 was remarkably turbulent and produced very rich dynamics.
                                                                                                                                                   
consistently over 1992-2000. Moreover, this is the only indicator used to officially assess the extent of
poverty by regions in Russia. Due to upward adjustments to the household income data to match
macroeconomic estimates of incomes, practiced by Goskomstat, money incomes are consistently higher than
household survey-based measures of total consumption (Yemtsov 2003).8
Figure 4: Regional per capita income to regional poverty lines in 1992 and 2000,




































Note: Average weighted by population size. Log scales.
Source: Calculated based on Goskomstat (various) and annually reported poverty lines.
1.5 Poverty and inequality between 1992 and 2000
Figure 5 shows on a national level the evolution of per capita incomes relative to the cost
of the poverty basket (dashed line). The second line captures the evolution of poverty
incidence as measured by the share of the population with money incomes below the
poverty line. The graph also illustrates the impact on the measured welfare index from an
introduction of the new (higher) poverty line adopted as the new official minimum
subsistence level in 2000 (the line marked with triangles for 1999-2001).
Figure 5 shows that starting with the shock of 1992, the evolution of real incomes in Russia
follows a clear two-hump trajectory: rising before 1995, with a subsequent fall in the (now
forgotten) crisis of 1995, and rising again to a historic high of 1997, to fall in the 1998-99
crisis. Although the costs associated with the 1998 meltdown were considerable—real
GDP fell by 5 per cent—the recession proved to be short-lived. By the end of 2000 poverty
returned to its precrisis level and by 2001 real incomes were at 10-15 per cent above the
level of 1992, if one uses the poverty line deflators. The corresponding story of poverty
looks like a mere reflection of the trend depicted by the evolution of money incomes.
Extrapolating the poverty rate based on the old line to 2001 data (dotted line), the figure
reveals that by 2001 poverty had gone down to the that of the lowest levels of the 1992-
2000 period, if measured with a constant standard. The fact that there is such stability in
the relationship between average real money incomes (expressed as a ratio to poverty line)
and the poverty rate, as depicted by the figure, would suggest that inequality has remained
roughly stable.20 The officially published data on inequality do not support this conclusion.
                                                
20 Any change in poverty can be decomposed to the change in the mean and the distribution , as shown by
Datt and Ravallion (1998). Shorrocks and Kolenikov (2001) propose an approach that explicitly includes9
These data, however, have been a subject of controversy in the research literature, and is
known to contradict the evidence from publicly available surveys (RLMS).21



























































Note: Officially published poverty headcount and calculated changes in per capita money incomes using
published poverty lines, 1992-2001. The 2001 poverty rate with the old basket is the author’s extrapolation
based on published distribution (grouped data).
Source: Goskomstat (various) and author’s calculations.
The series for official data on inequality and RLMS-based measures are plotted in
Figure  6. It also plots regionally consistent series on inequality computed by Yemtsov
(2003). Unfortunately, regionally disaggregated data are available only from 1994. This
cuts two starting years from our analysis and leaves 1994-2000 as the time frame for
analysis in this study. The figure shows notable difference not only in the levels, but also in
the trends for inequality for data from different sources. According to official data, highest
inequality was observed in Russia in 1994. In the estimated series inequality highs are
recorded in 1996-97, the time when the inequality was decreasing according to Goskomstat
data. In the 1998-99 crisis inequality did increase according to officially published data,
but consistent estimates based on the same sources show that it actually went down. This
paper is based on own estimates of the inequality (series marked by triangles), which is the
index consistently decomposable by all regions.
                                                                                                                                                   
changes in the poverty line in this decomposition framework. However, as our measure of real incomes are
money incomes divided by (a constant in real terms) poverty line, this factor can be omitted from future
analysis.
21 As documented in Commander et al. (1999).10
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Per capita incomes in
RLMS, direct data est.
Source: Darker line; Goskomstat (various) for official data on inequality in nominal incomes. Lighter line;
RLMS and estimates (money incomes to regional poverty lines) Commander et al. (1999) for 1992-93, and
Lokshin (2001) for subsequent years. Triangles: own estimates based on regional data published by
Goskomstat.
1.6 Regional inequality in Russia
Figure 4 presented the scale of regional disparities in Russia in 1992 and in 2000.
Averaging over the years 1992-2001, the richest region in Russia was Moscow with
incomes on average exceeding 3 times the national mean. At the opposite extreme, the
Ingush Republic in North Caucasus was the least prosperous, with real money per capita
equal to around 30 per cent of the average. Tuva Republic and Chita Oblast in Siberia and
Dagestan in North Caucasus were second to last, with 50-70 per cent. Among the locations
with the highest welfare are the predominantly resource-rich and/or export-oriented regions
of Siberia (Tyumen oblast, Krasnoyarsk krai, Irkutsk, Kemerov and Tomsk oblast) and the
northwest (Republic of Komi, Murmansk). In the richest group there are also several
industrially developed regions of the Volga Basin (Tatarstan Republic, Rostov, Perm and
Samara). The poorest Russian regions comprises, in addition to those already mentioned,
South Siberia and several agrarian regions of the Volga Basin (Marii El, Chuvash and
Mordova republics, Penza and Kirov oblast).
The distribution of regions by their real incomes was not constant over time. The extent of
such changes is revealed from the distribution of regions by the ratio of the regional
average money income per capita to official subsistence levels or regional poverty lines
(see Figure 7). For example, this ratio in 2000 was below 1.25 in 13 regions, but above 2.5
in 7 regions. Figure 7 shows that the histogram of distribution by real incomes was11
characterized by twin peaks in 1997, 1998, and 2000. Such a distribution form suggests a
tendency towards polarization. The figure records notable instability in the distribution of
regions by their levels of welfare over 1994-2000. It also shows a significant shift in the
distribution by groups in 1999 following the crisis, and a subsequent recovery mirroring
the precrisis distribution.































Source: Ovcharova et al. (2001). For 2000, author’s calculations using Goskomstat data.
Data also suggests that, when measured by an alternative measure of living standards,22 the
regional disparities in the living standards are almost as high as in the case of monetary
incomes. A simple Spearman correlation of the ranks between them is 0.75–0.79 for 1997-
2000, and the Kendall’s tau is between 0.50 and 0.60. Most of the regions are ranked as the
poorest according to both monetary incomes and disposable resources. Therefore
whichever measure is applied the size of regional disparities in Russia is large. When
measured by the ratio of incomes in the top to bottom decile of regions, regional economic
inequalities in Russia over this period (1:2.8) are at par with differences between regions of
countries constituting the European Union, and much bigger than those between states in
the United States.23 The size and persistence of European regional inequalities has
attracted much attention in the economic literature and is one of the key policy concerns of
the EU, whereas in Russia it has only recently become a widely discussed policy topic. The
spread of regions by their levels of inequality is substantial. Russia embraces both very
egalitarian and very unequal places. The Gini coefficient in 1999 varied from a low of
0.212 (Republic of Karachaevo-Cherkessk) to a high of 0.626 (Moscow). Noteworthy, the
rates of poverty in these locations in the same year were 64.6 per cent and 23.3 per cent,
respectively. This suggests that while in some regions of Russia people can be equally
poor, in others they are unequally well-off.
Figure  8 presents a histogram depicting changes over 1994-2000 in the distribution of
regions by the level of their Gini indices for per capita incomes (expressed as ratios to the
                                                
22 See Yemtsov (2003) for a detailed discussion.
23 See Boldrin and Canova (2001) for a review.12
median level of inequality in the country). Regions with values below 1 have levels of Gini
index below the inequality in the median Russian region for the corresponding year, and
those above one, record higher inequality. The distribution of Russian regions by their own
inequality levels has not experienced as radical changes as their distribution by income
levels. The figure shows that while most regions remained grouped quite closely to the
median level of inequality, some important changes have nevertheless occurred.
Specifically, the group of regions with inequality just above the median level (from 1 to
1.1) has increased dramatically between 1994 and 2000, while the group of regions with
extreme values of inequality either vanished (group of less than 75 per cent of the median
level), or was reduced.
Figure 8: Regional Gini indices for per capita incomes at ratio to the corresponding































Source: Yemtsov (2003) based on published regional data.
This section shows that the performance of the Russian regions in transition is very
diverse. Some regions have experienced dramatic changes in the level and the distribution
of real incomes, and none of the regions were unaffected by changes. Overall, the set of
dynamics produced in the Russian transition is very complex and these represent an
unrivalled subject to study determinants of the variation in regional poverty and inequality.
2 Trends in regional inequality and poverty in Russia
Section 1 of this paper demonstrated a very complex set of dynamics across Russian
regions over 1994-2000 in terms of real income and their distribution. This section will
establish whether one can discern any orderly trends in these movements. The first part
presents an integral view of the distribution as an aggregate of its regional components.
Second and third parts will analyse convergence or divergence across regions in their mean
incomes. The fourth part reveals trends in within-region inequality. The fifth part examines
the implications for poverty. Each topic starts with a short review of the literature,
followed by the theoretical framework and analysis of Russian data.13
2.1 Russian regions in 1994-2000: more inequality between the unequal
To what extent is the growing inequality in Russia due to increased regional variation? As
the transition started, several regions, such as Moscow, St Petersburg and Tyumen,
benefiting from their natural resources, unique geographical position and accumulated
human capital, significantly improved their standing vis-à-vis other regions. None of the
popular representations of Russian realities is more dramatic than a huge contrast between
the prosperity of Moscow and desperately grim images from Russian provinces. Is it
possible to explain Russian inequality by this gap between a limited group of successful
regions and a lagging majority?
These questions have prompted several researchers to analyse the regional dimension of
inequality in Russia. Decomposition of inequality provides a useful accounting framework
to assess the relative importance of between regional inequality and within regional
distribution. Earlier attempts to decompose inequality (see Commander et al. 1999)
suggested that regional differences play a very important role in explaining inequality
changes at the national level. But this attempt relied on RLMS with its limited regional
dimension. The findings of Commander et al., however, are quoted in the literature24 and
provide motivation for further analysis. Now, when the basic picture of inequality inside
each region based on HBS is established, one may attempt to provide a more accurate
representation of the regional inequality and its sources.
Disentangling components of inequality is a useful step in the analysis of regional
polarization,25 another hotly discussed topic in the transition literature. In the Russian
context, Fedorov (2002) introduced an explicit distinction between regional inequality and
regional polarization in Russia. Relying on monetary income and expenditures per capita
he finds that although regional inequality and polarization increased rapidly during 1991-
96, the increases levelled off in the late 1990s. It shows that the main dimensions of
increasing polarization are not so much that west–east, capitals–provinces, or ethnic
Russian–national republics divides, but that factors such as export shares of regions or the
relative sizes of their capitals do have effect. Fedorov posed questions on how the
inequality between regions is related to inequality within regions, and how important was
the increase in the interregional inequality in the Russian transition as an engine of overall
inequality. Because of the data limitations these questions remained without answer. This
section addresses the gap.
Commonly used inequality indices, such as Gini index or decile ratios are not strictly
decomposable by population groups. But following Bourguignon (1979) and Shorrocks
(1980) one can decompose the total level of inequality as measured by the Theil
                                                
24 Dolinskaya (2002).
25 As one of the indices of polarization uses the relationship between the between and within components of
inequality (Kanbur and Zhang 1999).14
generalized entropy inequality indices exactly into the sum of Wg, inequality from within
each of the groups in the partition of the population n into G disjoint groups (where a
subgroup g consists of ng individuals), plus the term representing the inequality between
groups, B. Here groups are regions. A similar approach to the Gini index would leave a
residual component due to the overlap of distributions, which is difficult to interpret.
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If total inequality is divided in the components B (between groups inequality) and Wg
(within groups), then T and T0 are:

























































Where  W  and W 0  represent the sum of the contribution to the overall inequality (as
measured by T and T0 respectively) due to the inequality within each of the subgroups of
the population, and B and B0 in the contribution to the national inequality due to the
inequality between mean incomes µg for subgroups g=1,...,G. If the weight of gth group in
the population is given by wg, and the income share by vg, and T0g and Tg are
correspondingly Theil mean log deviation and Theil entropy indices for the region g, the
following basic formula for decomposing both Theil indices into the within groups (first
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A question such as ‘how much inequality can be attributed to the inequality between
households in different regions?’ might have two interpretations: (i) ‘how much less15
inequality would be observed if regional differences are the only source of income
differences?’; and (ii) ‘by how much would inequality fall if region-related differences
were eliminated?’. Only by using T0 measure do we get numerically equivalent answers to
these two questions, and we will rely mostly on this measure. However, we will also report
results from the decomposition of T.
The lognormal distribution has a useful property,26 according to which two Theil indices
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parameters σg for each region g are estimated based on published data. Note, however, that
the national distribution is a sum of regional lognormal distributions (and thus generally
not a lognormal distribution itself), and the two national level Theil indices do not have to
be the same. As Theil indices are seldom used to assess the level and trends of inequality
we also compute the Gini coefficent for each aggregate distribution, using a simple
numerical approach (with partition of the whole distribution into a sufficiently large
number of intervals of real income and summing regional distributions by these intervals
with population weights).
Table 1: Inequality decomposition by regions of Russia for per capita real money incomes
using Theil mean log deviation index
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2000-94 2000-94, %
I. Total inequality in  per capita real incomes at the national level Change
Theil mean log deviation 0.297 0.282 0.316 0.337 0.314 0.319 0.339 0.041 +14
of which
Between regions 0.073 0.076 0.083 0.079 0.088 0.103 0.108 0.035 +47
as a share of total, % 25 27 26 23 28 32 32 84
Within regions 0.224 0.206 0.234 0.258 0.226 0.216 0.231 0.007 +3
as a share of total, % 75 73 74 77 72 68 68 16
Gini index 0.430 0.418 0.437 0.445 0.432 0.438 0.440 0.010 +2
II. Hypothetical distribution without Moscow, St Petersburg and Tyumen Change
Theil mean log deviation 0.192 0.171 0.198 0.230 0.212 0.209 0.225 0.033 +17
Between regions 0.049 0.051 0.054 0.044 0.045 0.051 0.051 0.003 +5
Within regions 0.143 0.12 0.144 0.186 0.167 0.158 0.174 0.030 22
Gini index 0.350 0.325 0.344 0.378 0.362 0.345 0.368 +5
Source: Author’s estimations based on published data.
Table 1 presents results of Theil T0 decomposition for per capita real money incomes. The
table is organized as follows: each column represents one year from 1994 to 2000; the two
                                                
26 Sigma is one of the two parameters defining lognormal distribution (variance). This property can be used
to test for lognormality of the empirical distribution.16
last columns report the total change in index over the entire period (in absolute value) and
the change expressed as percentage to the initial value. The table has two panels, I and II.
Panel I reports results for a full set of regions, while Panel II presents the simulated
national distribution, from which Moscow, St Petersburg and Tyumen are removed. This
hypothetical example helps to understand to what extent changes in the overall distribution
were driven by these three regions known as outliers. The first row in Panel I is the Theil
mean log deviation index for Russia. Over the period it rose from 0.297 to 0.339, a 14 per
cent increase.27 Note that the Gini coefficient (reported at the bottom of the first panel) for
the same period has changed only slightly by 2 per cent. This discrepancy is not very
surprising, as Theil mean log deviation and Gini indices are sensitive to changes in
different parts of the distribution.
The middle rows of the first panel report the W0 and B0 contributions to inequality. As
usually revealed by such decompositions, the bulk of inequality can be attributed to the
within-group components (75 per cent in 1994). Nonetheless, a sizable and, more
importantly, growing share of inequality is the result of the between-group differences,
which accounted for 25 per cent of overall inequality in 1994 and for 32 per cent in 2000.
This shift alone accounts for 84 per cent of the total increase in inequality in Russia
between 1994 and 2000. The share of interregional inequality even at the beginning of the
period was several times higher than similar shares in other European countries (see
Förster et al. 2003). The first conclusion from this analysis is that regional differences are
playing an increasingly important role in determining overall inequality. Up to 85 per cent
of the total inequality increase during 1994-2000 can be attributed to the widening of
interregional inequities.28
Repeating this decomposition while removing Moscow, St Petersburg and Tyumen from
the distribution offers valuable insights. The last row in the second panel shows that Gini
index of this hypothetical distribution would be significantly lower than the actual one (by
about 16 per cent), but the inequality would increase faster compared to what was actually
observed (the Gini would increase by 5 per cent as opposed to just 2).29 The second
conclusion therefore is that, contrary to popular opinion, inequality in Russia is not the
inequality within these three regions and between these three regions and the rest of the
country.
                                                
27 This level of inequality is substantially higher than in other countries. Using World Bank data (2000) for
comparable per capita income, we find that inequality was in 1998 0.17 in Poland, 0.11 in Slovenia, Hungary
and the Czech Republic, and 0.22 in Croatia.
28 Use of the  Theil entropy index T yields qualitatively similar results. The share of inequality explained by
the between component has increased from 25 per cent in 1994 to 29 per cent in 2000. Overall 54 per cent of
the total inequality change as measured by T can be explained by the increase in the interregional differences
in means.
29 For the  Theil entropy index T the level of inequality would be reduced by as much as a half in 2000 if the
three regions will be removed from the distribution, but the overall size of inequality increase will remain
unaffected by this experiment.17
The inspection of the middle rows of panel two in Table 1—representing changes in
inequality by components with the three above mentioned regions removed—shows indeed
that the inequality as measured by T0 would increase by a sizeable 0.033 compared to 0.044
actually observed. But the decomposition shares would change considerably. In contrast to
the actually observed changes, most of the change in inequality would come from
interregional distribution, while the share of intraregional differences would remain stable.
This exercise highlights the empirical importance for Russia in 1994-2000 of both stylized
facts; the increased gap between high-income regions (such as Moscow, Tyumen and St
Petersburg) and the rest of the country, and increasingly unequal distributions within other
regions. We will now examine the first, that is increased variation between regions, before
investigating the trend in the second factor.
2.2 Regional convergence in Russia
Reading the press reports one gets an impression that the outcome of transition by regions
so far has been largely predetermined by the initial conditions, ultimately by the place of a
region in the Soviet hierarchy, and that the market has moved the initially somewhat
unequal regions further apart. Those who were doing better under communist rule are
prospering under the market by reforming, privatizing and changing. But those who were
poor are set to remain so in a self-perpetuating circle of impoverishment and poor policies.
This image sadly contradicts the view of market reforms with opportunities for most to
advance. How accurate is this representation and how persistent are regional inequities?
The answer to this question requires an application of a set of models that were developed
to study convergence across countries. Empirical studies on economic convergence are
also extended to convergence across regions of countries.30 This framework was recently
enriched with the analysis of mobility of regions across the entire distribution, which we
will review in detail in the next section.31
It is interesting that among researchers studying the Russian transition a consensus over the
lack of convergence was achieved, even before any data become available.32 Until very
recently there were only a very few papers on regional convergence in Russia. Hanson and
Bradshaw (2000), in their literature review on the regional dimension of systemic
transformations in Russia, noted ‘It is generally accepted that economic transition has
                                                
30 The regional studies by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992) for states within the US and Europe, de La
Fuente (1996) for Spain, Shioji (1996) for Japan, Coulombe and Lee (1995) for Canada and by Persson
(1994) for Sweden, all conclude that there is indeed convergence across regions of the countries under
investigation. What is important, is that the nature of convergence is absolute, which is often taken as
evidence that regions within national boundaries are more likely to share similar economic and social
characteristics. Regional convergence studies were long restricted to regions within developed nations
because of the lack of data, but recently the literature on regional convergence expanded to developing
nations. See the study on Indian states by Cashin and Sahay (1996) and by Bandyopadyaya (2002), by
Filiztekin (1999) for Turkish provinces, and Andalon and Lopez-Calva (2002) for Mexican states.
31 See for example Bandyopadyaya (2002) on the convergence across Indian states.
32 See Mikheeva (1999) for a thorough review.18
widened the gap between the rich and the poor, both in terms of individuals in society and
regions in the federation. Yet there has been a relative lack of academic research
examining the relationship between transition and regional inequality’.33
Authors of early contributions, with the exception of Mikheeva (1999) used the coefficient
of variation as an inequality measure and applied it to several economic and social
indicators including industrial output, housing availability and consumption of several food
items. Russian convergence in a standard theoretical framework was thoroughly studied by
Mikheeva (1999) using data for 1980-97. She found no convergence in real per capita
incomes (and some signs of divergence for the part of the data representing transition
(1990-97). Similar results were obtained for Russia by Carluer and Sharipova (2001), who
found no absolute convergence for nominal per capita income between 1985 and 1999, and
only weak conditional convergence in regional gross products and industrial output per
capita. Importantly, both studies have shown that the standard growth model framework
constituting a base for convergence analysis cannot be usefully applied to transition
dynamics. These studies, however, are plagued by two problems: data and weak conceptual
frameworks. This paper uses regional money incomes divided by regional poverty lines as
welfare indices, and shows that this measure gives a more accurate representation of the
regional variation compared to commonly used CPI deflated indices.
The problems with theoretical framework are more serious. Often 1990, 1991, or even
1985, are selected as starting points in the convergence analysis, overlooking crucial
assumptions underlying convergence analysis. Neoclassical growth theory with standard
assumption about decreasing returns to reproducible factors yields the following
transitional dynamics of the output per capita around the steady state:
ln(yt) = e - 
β T ln(y0) + (1 - e - 
β T) ln(y*)( 6 )
where yt is the output per capita y0 and y* are the initial level and the steady state level of
output, respectively. This equation implies that the average growth rate of output per capita
over an interval from time 0 to time T is
(1/T) [ln(yT) - ln(y0)] = x + [(1 - e - 
β T)/T] [ln(y*) - ln(y0)] (7)
where x is the growth rate of steady state level of output. Holding steady state growth rate
and convergence rate constant across time and economic units, the equation shows that the
growth rate of output is negatively related to initial level of output, and convergence rate,
β,  which can be estimated from regression of the value of y at point in time T to its value at
previous period t:
                                                
33 Recently, the results of two major studies of regional economies in Russia have been published, one by
Hanson and Bradshaw (2000), and another by Westlund et al. (2000). The Russian language periodical
Regions: Economics and Sociology has published a series of papers on regional inequality (Mikheeva 1999;
Kournishev 1999; Lavrovsky 1999; and Treivish 1999).19
ln(yT/ yt)/ (T - t) = c - b ln(yt) + ut  (8)
with usual assumptions about the error term and using that:
b = [(1 – e - 
β (T - t))/(T - t)]  (9)
Extending to i regions and assuming equal rate of convergence yields absolute
convergence result if b>0. This framework critically depends on the assumption of the
same steady state values and trends across time. This assumption is hard to defend in the
context of transition, and therefore the starting point t has to be moved forward. But this
movement shrinks already short data series available to even shorter period. This dilemma
is a blight on all convergence tests for Russia.
Generally, with the liberalization of economic activity and reduced fiscal resources
characterizing early transition years, one should expect a considerable widening of the
distribution. As demonstrated by Adelman and Vujovic (1998), central planning by trying
to redistribute in favour of lagging regions within socialist economies artificially held back
the regions with highest potential for growth. These pressures, however, never fully
impacted and at the start of transition the distribution of regions can be represented as a
compressed distribution compared to the one implied by economic forces. Thus at first it is
expected that regions will diverge, moving to their equilibrium income levels. But once the
market forces are unleashed, other mechanisms, including political economy, start to work
that could eventually lead to a reduction of the spread. This observation underlines the
need for utmost care in selecting time periods for studying convergence.
Figure 9: Real per capita income by region in 1992 (log) and average annual growth rate


































Source: Author’s estimates (growth rates) based on published data.20
Figure 10: Real per capita income by region in 1994 (log) and average annual growth rate


































Source: Author’s estimates (growth rates) based on published data.
The point is illustrated by the comparison of Figures 9 and 10. Both figures plot the
average annual growth rates of real money incomes per capita in Russian regions against
their initial values (in logs), but they take different starting points: Figure 9 plots average
growth rates over 1992-2000 to 1992 values, while Figure 10 takes 1994 as a starting point.
Casual inspection of Figure 9 may suggest the existence of convergence, as higher level
values of real incomes in 1992 are associated with lower subsequent growth rates (one can
fit the downward sloping line through dots that would yield a certain rate of convergence).
Indeed the cross-sectional regression produces a statistically significant estimate of
β  (Equations 9 and 10) of  0.06. This apparently strong correlation completely vanishes in
Figure 10. There are no more clear signs of convergence, as regions seem to form a cloud
rather than a line, and the estimate of β  gives only weakly significant values (at 15 per cent
confidence) of convergence around 2 per cent per year. Both these finding are in contrast
with earlier studies cited earlier, which relied on 1991 or 1985 as starting points and CPI
deflated incomes, suggesting that these choices influenced the results. The assumption of
equality of steady states across regions is removed in the definition of sigma-convergence,
which is a simple tendency of regions to move closer to each other; specifically, the values
of standard deviation of the mean of the log of a variable of interest have to decrease, i.e.
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and in the case studied in this paper, yit is per capita real incomes to poverty lines in region
i in year t, µt is the average value of log yit.21
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Source: Calculation based on published data on average per capita incomes and poverty lines by years and
regions.
Figure 11 plots the value of σt  for real incomes per capita in Russian regions. It suggests
rather stable values of variation across regions over 1992-97, and a robust increase in
1997-2000. Mikheeva (1999) reports falling levels between 1990 and 1994, one year jump
in 1995, followed by no change over 1996-97. Both the level and the tendency are in
striking contrast with results reported in Mikheeva (1999) for money incomes per capita
deflated by CPI. The analysis of absolute and conditional convergence shows that it is
difficult to discern any definite trend of convergence across Russian regions, data problems
are key. The period 1992-2000 seems to include two subperiods with different trends:
1994-97 and 1997-2000.
2.3 Mobility of Russian regions across the distribution
Studies of convergence using the standard regression framework briefly reviewed in the
pervious part of this section consider average or representative behaviour and say little
about prospects of interregional mobility. An alternative approach uses mobility across the
distribution in time to uncover long-term tendencies in the evolution of the distribution
across the full spectrum of income levels.34 The formulation of the approach relies on a
key assumption (first-order Markov chain) that given the current realization of a process
determining mobility, its future realizations are independent of the past. Although the
assumption of first-order Markov process was criticized by Shorrocks (1976) in its
applications to individual-level data on income mobility, it gained a wider use in the
analysis of aggregated, such as country- or region-level, data. For Russia, this method was
applied by Dolinskaya (2002) to study the regional mobility in real incomes per capita in
                                                
34 See the application of a full version of stochastic kernels to Indian states by Bandyopadhyay (2002).22
the period 1970-97, and in particular 1991-97. Her analysis reveals a very rich and
complex set of dynamics, suggesting polarization into rich and poor convergence clubs and
provides insights into the determinants of regional mobility. It suffers, however, from the
same problems as the previously mentioned studies—the choice of both the base period
(1991) and the final point (1997), and the use of a ‘noisy’ deflator based on CPI. The
welfare index used in this paper may help to address some of these limitations, and it is
useful to briefly review the theoretical framework for such analysis before applying it to
the data in hand.
The transition matrix approach to studying dynamics of income distribution, pioneered by
Quah (1993), focuses on capturing how the whole distribution evolves over time. At any
point in time t regions occupy a certain position in the distribution F in the country. The
movement to the next period t+1 can be described by a (stochastic) operator T, so that
F t+1= TFt (11)
The task is to infer T from the observed data. In practice, this task is simplified by
partitioning F into n finite states, or intervals of income, in which case T becomes a matrix
M (n×n). Each element mij in this matrix can be estimated from a sequence of observed
transitions and represent a probability of moving from an initial state i to a state j. The
sequence of Mt describing all transitions in the future converges to a limiting matrix
(i.e., such that it will remain unchanged from t to t+1) if Ft is described by the distribution
_
λ , called ergodic. It is shown that this distribution is unique, and
M λ λ = (12)
The approach requires meaningful partition of F into intervals. Following the approach
developed by Dolisnkaya (2002), this paper partitions the distribution of regions by their
level of real incomes into five intervals, as reported in Table 2: the poorest with incomes
below 0.7 of the national mean; next is between 0.7 and 0.9 of the mean; followed by the
‘middle’ between 0.9 and 1.1; by the upper middle (1.1 to 1.3); and finally the rich (above
1.3). The table consists of four different panels. Panel A takes a snapshot of the mobility by
comparing the position of each region in 1994 to its position in 2000. This period is then
broken on panels B and C into two subperiods (1994-97 and 1997-2000). Finally, the last
panel D represents the last period 1997-2000 as an aggregation of all transitions that
occurred in 1997-98, 1998-99 and 1999-2000.
Matrices presented in Table 2 are self-explanatory. For example, the first element in the
matrix presented in Panel A shows that with probability of 0.67 the poorest regions in 1994
will remain poor in 2000; they will move one class up with the probability of 0.17.
Probabilities sum to one across columns in each row. The diagonal of each matrix is in
bold print as it shows the persistence of the distribution. In addition to the matrix of23
Table 2: Dynamics of the regional distribution in Russia by the level of real per capita
income 1994-2000
A. Whole period: actual transitions between 1994 and 2000 (one 6-year transition)
2000 position (class of income) Income intervals (regional per capita
money  incomes to regional poverty line) <0.7 0.7-0.9 0.9-1.1 1.1-1.3 >1.3
<0.7 0.67 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.00
 0.7- 0.9 0.19 0.41 0.26 0.15 0.00
0.9-1.1 0.08 0.40 0.28 0.12 0.12





>1.3 0.13 0.00 0.38 0.13 0.38
Starting frequency (regions in each class in 1994) 0.08 0.35 0.32 0.14 0.10
Ending frequency (regions in each class in 2000) 0.16 0.31 0.29 0.14 0.10
Ergodic distribution 0.24 0.28 0.24 0.15 0.09
B. First subperiod: transition between 1994 and 1997 (one 3-year transition)
Position in 1997 (class of income) Income intervals
(per capita incomes to poverty lines) <0.7 0.7-0.9 0.9-1.1 1.1-1.3 >1.3
<0.7 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
 0.7- 0.9 0.07 0.52 0.33 0.07 0.00
0.9-1.1 0.08 0.20 0.48 0.16 0.08





>1.3 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.50 0.25
Starting frequency (regions in each class in 1994) 0.08 0.35 0.32 0.14 0.10
Ending frequency (regions in each class in 1997) 0.09 0.31 0.36 0.17 0.06
Ergodic distribution 0.11 0.31 0.37 0.15 0.06
C. Second subperiod: transition between 1997 and 2000 (one 3-year transition)
Position in 2000 (class of income) Income intervals
 (per capita incomes to poverty lines) <0.7 0.7-0.9 0.9-1.1 1.1-1.3 >1.3
<0.7 0.86 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
 0.7- 0.9 0.21 0.54 0.17 0.08 0.00
0.9-1.1 0.04 0.32 0.50 0.14 0.00





>1.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Starting frequency (regions in each class in 1997) 0.09 0.31 0.36 0.17 0.06
Ending frequency (regions in each class in 2000) 0.16 0.31 0.29 0.14 0.10
Ergodic distribution 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.78
D. Second subperiod: year to year transition between 1997 and 2000 (average of three 1-year transitions)
Final ( 2000) position (class of income) Income intervals (per capita incomes to
poverty lines) <0.7 0.7-0.9 0.9-1.1 1.1-1.3 >1.3
<0.7 0.89 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
 0.7- 0.9 0.11 0.79 0.10 0.00 0.00
0.9-1.1 0.00 0.17 0.61 0.23 0.00





income) >1.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Starting frequency (regions in each class in 1997) 0.09 0.31 0.36 0.17 0.06
Ending frequency (regions in each class in 2000) 0.16 0.31 0.29 0.14 0.10
Ergodic distribution 0.19 0.18 0.10 0.06 0.47
Source: Author’s estimates.24
transitions, each panel also contains three rows that provide useful insights into the
dynamics of the distribution by income classes. The first row below the matrix presents the
initial distribution by income classes, the second row the final distribution, and the third
row the ergodic distribution which would prevail in the long run provided that transition
dynamics remain unchanged. For example, by glancing over these three rows in Panel A
for the first income interval (regions with incomes below 70 per cent of the national mean),
one observes a very worrying expansion of this class from only 8 per cent of all regions in
1994 to 16 per cent in 2000, and poised to increase further in the long run to 24 per cent of
all regions.
Each element in the transition matrix is essentially a stochastic parameter which is
estimated based on data from actual transitions. The precision of an estimate will depend
on how many transitions are assessed. By taking only starting and ending points, as in
panels A-C, the analysis uses only limited information. On the other hand, the use of all
transitions by years between starting and ending points, as panel D in Table 2 does, may
blur the long-term tendencies with short-term fluctuations. Annex II shows different
aggregations across years to estimate transition matrices, and assess the accuracy of
predictions. Over the entire period under study, 1994-2000, the transition matrix and the
ergodic distribution of Russian regions by their income levels display somewhat less
persistence than suggested by the analysis in Dolinskaya (2002). For example, the
probability of remaining rich, estimated using data from 2 three-year transitions between
1991 and 1997, is shown to be 0.75, while Annex II shows it, using data from 1994-2000,
at 0.54 with the same methodology. The probability for remaining in the lowest income
class though is exactly the same, 0.69. Properties of ergodic distribution are also similar;
there is sizeable group of poor regions (24 per cent in the panel A) forecast to remain poor,
and a small but persistent group of rich regions (9 per cent in Table 2, and 17 per cent
according to Dolinskaya 2002).
Disaggregation into subperiods produces new findings. Transitions over 1994-97 presented
on Panel B display weak persistence and smaller tails in the ergodic distribution,
suggesting greater convergence to the middle class, than the whole 1994-2000 period.
These dynamics were reversed in 1997-2000. Panels C and D show significant persistence
at the tails of the distribution (the poor staying poor with almost 90 per cent probability,
and the rich stuck with 100 per cent probability of remaining rich). As a result, the ergodic
distribution displays classical features of polarization into two convergence clubs; richer
regions, and a smaller but sizeable group of very poor regions, with a vanishing middle
section. This conclusion is robust to the aggregation method as the comparison of panels C
and D would suggest.
The finding of emerging tendency towards polarization for 1997-2000 should be taken
with several caveats. The Annex II compares predicted probabilities based on the Markov
first order process assumptions with the actual ones, and reveals significant imprecision in
the model’s prediction. But even with these limitations one can claim that there is no
apparent sign of convergence across regions of Russia25
2.4 Convergence in inequality: are Russian regions becoming equally unequal?
Despite the increasing role of interregional differences, the bulk of inequality is still
coming from within the regions. Table 1 demonstrates that on aggregate there has been
stability in the contribution of this component over time. What is behind it? Is it possible to
identify trends and regularities in within-region changes in inequality? In other words, is
inequality trended in any particular sense in each Russian region? Is there an identifiable
convergence between regions in terms of inequality? How are the short-term dynamics
influenced by longer term trends?
The motivation behind attempting to study convergence in the levels of inequality is clear
as, ultimately, it is a test of market operations. Neoclassical growth models imply not only
convergence in average incomes, but also in the distribution. Countries or regions with the
same fundamentals should trend towards the same invariant distribution of wealth and
pretax income. Application of the optimal taxation models to transition economies
settings35 revealed also factors mapping the pretax (or market) income into the distribution
of disposable income. Key parameters defining this mapping are features in the fiscal
system, and the extent of public goods provision by the state. Once the regions are
characterized by similar parameters in these dimensions, one may expect the fiscal systems
to operate in a way (given all of its general equilibrium effects) that would produce similar
post-redistribution inequality levels across regions.
Regions of Russia prima facie have very different inequality aversion parameters, as may
be revealed by a spread of regions across the political spectrum and significant regional
differences in voting patterns. The observed behaviour, however, might be endogenous.36
As shown in Ravallion and Lokshin (1999) proper treatment of revealed preferences gives
significant differences in the attitudes to redistribution across some groups, such as urban
and rural populations, but does not produce significant regional effects. Given the common
history and commonality of some cultural institutions it should not be surprising that
inequality aversion will not differ much across regions of Russia. Normally such
preferences are known to differ across countries (as shown in Alesina et al. 2002), but not
within the countries.
Key parameters of reductions of the public sector were common across regions of Russia
(World Bank 1996), and produced similar outcomes. Regions did differ in the fiscal
capacity considerably, but the system of fiscal federalism in Russia was known to produce
a common set of rules and a common fiscal space (Zhuravskaya 2000). Only some regions
(so called ‘donor’ regions with positive fiscal balances, rich regions in our classification)
clearly stands out amidst these trends. Within these common patterns, regions of Russia
                                                
35 Kanbur and Tuomala (2002).
36 And lead to more redistribution in more unequal places, as shown in cross-country studies such as
Milanovic (1999b). This might be a mechanism that eventually equalizes regions in terms of their levels of
inequality.26
display substantial differences in particular forms of adjustment and/or in the speed at
which it occurred. Thus, one may expect to see a very gradual and uneven convergence in
the levels of inequality as determined by the fundamentals.
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Source: Data from Yemtsov (2003) based on published data from HBS.
A simple intuition is presented in Figure 12. The figure plots original (1994) values of
regional Gini indices for per capita incomes on the horizontal axis, against subsequent
change in the region’s Gini index over the period 1994-2000 on the vertical axis. The
horizontal line through the scatter plot represents no change of Gini over time, and the
vertical line depicts median level of Gini observed across regions in 1994. Two outliers are
labelled on the graph: Moscow with the level of inequality already close to 0.6 in 1994;
and North Osetia on the top left with very low original inequality which more than doubled
over the entire period. The graph reveals evidence of convergence. The higher the initial
level of inequality, the more likely was a region to see a fall in its inequality by the year
2000. In contrast to the growth literature, there has been only a handful of studies looking
at this inequality convergence, concentrating exclusively on cross-country datasets.37
Clearly, no such attempt has ever been undertaken using data for Russia.
Borrowing from the literature on convergence in mean income, the simplest test for
inequality convergence across regions is to regress observed changes over time in
inequality (measured, say, by the Gini index) to its initial values. Keeping the same
notations as in Ravallion (2001), let Git denote the observed measure of inequality in a
region i for t=0,1,…T period; the test equation for convergence is then
                                                
37 See Ravallion (2001) for a review.27
GiT-Gi0=a+bGi0+ei,  (13)
ei is an error term. If the convergence parameter b (analogous to β in means convergence
literature) is negative, then there is inequality convergence, and for non-zero b, steady state
inequality converges to an expected value similar across regions of –a/b. Application of
this simple test to the actual data, as shown by Ravallion (2001), requires serious
examination of concerns about the measurement error in the inequality indices, because
these problems may have considerable effects on the results of convergence tests. If the
initial level of inequality is underestimated (and there are reasons to believe it is in the
context of Russia), the application of the simple framework will lead to overestimation of
the subsequent trend. Thus, the dynamic structure of regional inequality has to be taken
into account to determine its trend. Measurement error in the inequality data will bias a
convergence test in the direction of suggesting convergence. We therefore employ a
version of the test proposed by Ravallion (2001) that is robust to measurement error in the
inequality data; it also uses panel structure of the data. Test equation to be estimated on
Russian regional data can be written, as in Ravallion (2001)
GiT-Gi1=(α+βGi1)(t-1)+eit (14)
Where, as shown by Ravallion, composite error term eit is such that it cannot be assumed
that cov(Git,eit)=0. But one can use Gi0 (level of inequality in 1994) as an instrument for
‘error free’ G*i1 in 1995; this estimation can be also performed together with other data to
control for initial conditions that are supposedly not correlated with the measurement error
to obtain as accurate an estimate as possible of error free G*i1.38 The equation to be
estimated then becomes
GiT-G*i1=(α+βG*i1)(t-1)+eit (15)
This equation can be generalized to a linear panel data model of a measure of inequality on
the region-specific initial level of inequality in 1995 (instrumented with 1994 level), and a
time trend. Results of the test are reported in Table 3. These are regressions of the change
in Gini index between each year and the 1995 (although the OLS estimate could have used
1994 data also, but these are removed to maintain comparability). As in Ravallion (2001),
there are only small differences between robust specification allowing for the measurement
error and straightforward OLS formulation. The table reports strong indication of
convergence. The long-run Gini implied by this estimate are all around 0.35; rather close to
actually observed mean level of inequality. The slope coefficient are significant and imply
much faster convergence than obtained in cross-country estimate by Ravallion (2001). This
estimate allows the identification of short-term dynamics as well. These dynamics imply
that each region is converging to its ‘true’ level of inequality which is given by the long-
term trend.
                                                
38 Results from the instrumental variable regression are reported in Annex III.28
Table 3: Inequality convergence: test results
Dependent variable is GiT-G*i1 Intercept ( ) Slope (ß) R
2 N Long-run Gini
 Panel OLS
a 0.0617073 -.1812326 0.5376 383 0.340
(.0105084) (.0278383)
Panel OLS on restr. Sample
b .0700591 -.2088037 0.623 373 0.335
(.0114166) (.0308504)
IVE with Gini only
c .0563303 -.1609836 0.3794 383 0.350
(0109525) (0296237)
IVE, large instrument set
d .0621956 -.1778161 0.4221 383 0.350
(.0157239) (.042447)
IVE large set, rest. Sample
e .0775095 -.2297803 0.5052 373 0.337
(.0187333) (.0526736)
Note: Data on regional Gini indices for real money per capita incomes; dependent variable is expressed in
points. Stata command xtpcse is used which produces panel corrected standard error (PCSE) estimates for
linear cross-sectional time-series models; when computing the standard errors and the variance–covariance
estimates, the disturbances are assumed to be heteroskedastic. 
aPanel regression using actual data for 1994,
no instruments. 
bSame as 
abut with Moscow and Tyumen removed. 
cUses the value of Gini in 1994 as an
instrument for Gini in 1995. 
dUses Gini in 1994 initial conditions and time invariant characteristics of the region
to instrument for Gini in 1995, which is then used as initial value 0. 
eSame as previous, but with Moscow and
Tyumen removed. Bold marks preferred estimate, standard errors in parenthesis.
Source: Author.
Assuming that each region has a true underlying trend of inequality Ri, which can be
revealed using the original instrumented value of G*i1
G*it-G*i1=Ri(t-1)+νit (16)
ν is a zero-mean innovation term.
Disentangling trends in short-term dynamics requires a simple assumption that the
observed inequality index is only partially adjusted at any given point in time to its
underlying true value. Now imposing the restriction of the equality of autoregression
coefficients across regions, the observed measure of inequality in a given region in a given
period of time can be estimated using the following model:
Git=φGit-1+(1-φ)G*it+εit, (17)
where G* is the true (error free) measure of inequality, and ε is an error term showing the
difference between the true underlying inequality and measured inequality, which is
assumed to be first-order autocorrelated. Table 4 reports estimates of the short-run
parameter  φ for 1995-2000 (1994 data had to be used to create an instrument). This
estimate φ implies that the short-run movements of inequality are rather slow. Assume that
the region has a current level of Gini index value of 0.45, while its underlying level for this
year is 0.4. Then the estimate implies that next year the inequality will change to 0.4399, or
by 2.3 per cent. This estimate implies that whatever is the long-run level of inequality,
Russian regions will reach it very slowly, pointing to the persistence of differences in the29
inequality over time and complex dynamics. The empirical dynamics of inequality changes
and implied long-term trends are illustrated in Figure 13 for two Russian regions.
Table 4: Estimates for short-run dynamics of regional Gini indices based on their long-
term trends
Dependent variable: observed
Gini for money incomes in the current year Coef. Std. Err. z
Gini for money incomes in the prev. year 0.682991 0.030216 22.604
Trend value for Gini index based on iv initial val. 1-  0.331475 0.03201 10.355
Note: Panel data, gtee with ar(1) option in stata. Number of obs 460, 
2 43636.91 Pearsons’ 
2 (454) = 0.86,
Pearson’s dispersion 0.00189. Test on equality of (1-   + )=1, 
2 = 7.66, P value 0.0056.
Source: Author.
















Source: predictions based on Table 3.
Figure 13 is composed of two panels. The left panel represents Ivanovskaya oblast with
originally low inequality level; the right panel, Chitinskaya oblast, gives the dynamics of
inequality within the region with high initial values of Gini index. The figure shows a30
(common) long-term level of inequality based on regression results presented in Table 3.
This level is shown as a horizontal line on the right and left panels. The estimated short-
term trend from parameters reported in Table 4 is plotted as an upward slopping line on the
left panel (in this region the initial level of inequality is below its long-term value, thus it
has to increase), and downward sloping line on the right panel (the opposite is true;
initially the region had a higher Gini than long term 0.35). The actual movement of Gini
from year to year is shown by bumpy lines. This figure illustrates well both the long-term
dynamics and the extent of short-term fluctuations around it, explaining the slow
convergence estimated from results reported in Table 4. This part of the paper establishes
robust results on inequality convergence across Russian regions in 1994-2000. Evidence of
convergence towards some common level of inequality fits well the general expectations
based on conceptual framework linking the forces determining the shape of distribution in
transition.
2.5 Poverty projections and preliminary conclusions
Both trends in regional mean real incomes and trends in within-region distributions matter
for poverty changes at the national level. Trends in regional means determine the share of
the population living in poor regions. Intraregional distributions matter, because given a
regional mean it can be determined how many people will be poor in that region. Poverty
at the national level can change if the number of poor in regions changes, or if inequality
within regions shifts.
The analysis in this section highlight the lack of convergence in the regional means, and
convergence to similar levels of inequality across the regions. How would national
inequality look if these trends are to persist? A simple simulation using the decomposition
framework presented in subsection 2.1 is informative. Instead of taking the actual values of
the Theil mean log deviation index, we can now derive the long-term Theil index which
will be equal across all regions using the long-term value of Gini index derived in
subsection 2.4.39 Based on this calculation it is easy to reckon that the within-region
component of the Theil mean log deviation index will be reduced by about 15 per cent
compared to its 2000 value. If the inequality between regions will remain at its 2000 level,
this will mean the reduction in the national level inequality by 10 per cent as measured by
Theil T0 index. A more intuitive measure, the Gini index, will record only a slight
improvement falling from 0.44 to 0.425. This simulation is, of course, very hypothetical. It
is unrealistic, based on the results presented in subsections 2.2-2.3, to assume that
interregional inequality will stay at its 2000 levels. Thus, inequality in Russia is poised to
increase. But such an increase could occur only gradually, as receding within-region
inequality may compensate to a certain extent the unequalizing effect of regional
divergence. The level of inequality implied by the Gini index between 0.425 and 0.45 that
are projected in this simulation are informative, as they suggest that Russia will belong to
                                                
39 Which, conveniently for lognormal distribution assumed to prevail within each region is Gini=2Φ(σ/2)-1,
where σ is the parameter defining Theil index, and Φ denotes the standard normal distribution function.31
the high inequality club, despite the fact that within each region the distributions are likely
to converge to a middle level of inequality of 0.35.
One can go a step further and combine projected levels of inequality with the likely growth
paths of the regional real incomes levels derived from the transition matrices depicted in
Table 2. To reflect the most recent dynamics, simulation takes the values from Panel D
which represent an aggregate of 1997-2000. Such aggregations are normally considered as
robust estimates of transitions. For each region its future real income level is projected
based on its 2000 value, and the cumulative probabilities derived form 10 times repetition
of the process depicted by the matrix in Panel D. Subsequently, the table projects future
level of poverty if regions are to converge in 10 years to a common level of inequality as
established in subsection 2.3. To derive poverty rates, simulation assumes that the shape of
the real income distribution within each region will remain approximated by the lognormal
form. Finally, it is assumed that the national mean will grow at a rate of 3 per cent per
annum over ten years. Results with projected poverty incidence are presented in Table 5.
Each row represents the initial (2000) income class where regions are grouped by the level
of regional real income (expressed as ratio to regional poverty lines) compared to the
national average real income (exactly as in Table 2). The columns report values for poverty
incidence under various scenarios.
Table 5: Poverty projections, 2010























<0.7 0.49 0.50 0.39 0.40 0.34 0.26
 0.7- 0.9 0.34 0.36 0.29 0.31 0.19 0.18
0.9-1.1 0.23 0.24 0.19 0.20 0.11 0.10
1.1-1.3 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.08 0.07
>1.3 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.08 0.02
Poverty incidence,
all-Russia
0.25 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.14 0.11
Note: Intervals are based on the regional per capita money  incomes in 2000 to regional poverty line,
expressed as ratios to the national average. All poverty incidence figures are weighted by the population of
regions in 2000. Poverty incidence is the share of regional population with incomes below the poverty line.
Source: Author’s estimates.
The first column of Table 5 reports actual values for 2000. The poverty incidence varied in
2000 from 49 per cent on average in the group of poorest regions to 14 per cent in a group
of rich regions. The second column gives estimates of poverty if the trend towards
inequality convergence is to bring all regions to the same inequality levels. Interestingly,
this trend will affect poverty only minimally in all groups, except the richest regions where
it will go down to six per cent of the population. The third column simulates the results of32
divergence based on the transition matrix approach. No assumptions are introduced about
the growth of the overall all-Russia mean incomes so far, and all observed effects are only
results of the mobility across income classes. Reduction of poverty for the low-income
regions are quite substantial: in the group of poorest regions poverty is projected to
decrease from 49 per cent in 2000, to 39 per cent in 10 years. But relatively well-off
regions are almost unaffected. Thus, despite the divergence, the overall vector of changes
as suggested by the mobility over 1997-2000 is uplifting. The fourth column further
enriches this scenario, combining the results of mobility projections with the trend
determined by the inequality convergence. Since most of the ‘action’ in poverty rates are
driven by the mobility across income classes these results are not that substantially
different from what is reported in the third column. The fifth column introduces explicit
assumptions about growth of national mean real incomes of equal 3 per cent per annum
growth over 10 years for all regions and all parts of the distribution (i.e., inequality within
regions is assumed to remain constant). In other words, the whole distribution simply shifts
to higher real incomes. The effect on poverty is significantly more pronounced than the
impact of mobility per se. Thus, better overall economic performance is likely to have very
significant impact on poverty. Finally, the last and most informative column combines
mobility, inequality convergence and national mean growth. The projection shows that a
combined effect of these factors will reduce the poverty rate in Russia to 11 per cent; less
than half of its level in 2000. It is striking that the effect on the richest regions is
particularly large; poverty is almost completely eliminated (falling to just 2 per cent of the
population from 14 per cent in 2000) in the group with real incomes per capita more than
30 per cent over the national mean in 2000.
While the overall outcome seems very positive at first glance, it is informative that the last
column suggests that 56 per cent of Russia’s poor will be concentrated in a group of
regions with income levels below 90 per cent of the national average, and only 3 per cent
will be found in the upper income group. This is a dramatic change compared to 2000
when the corresponding shares were 47 and 11 per cent. That the regions seem to converge
to some predetermined levels of poverty should not misguide anyone. It does not mean that
policies are of no effect. First we have seen that this conclusion is based on historically
short period and needs to be revisited if and when more data comes on stream. Second, as
we have seen, this process, if left to operate on its own, will polarize the country. The
economic distance between the rich and the poor regions presents an important indicator of
differences in values and aspirations. If the rich and the poor share no common economic
and social reality, there will be little or no agreement on common social goals or vehicles
to achieve these goals.
3  Chance, choice, or fortune? Factors determining regional inequality
So far we have assumed that underlying forces at work reveal within-region distributions
determined by economic fundamentals. To what extent do regions differ in their paths of
inequality changes and to what extent it is determined by their policies? Viewed from its33
end point (convergence) inequality at a given point in time in a region is a product of its
initial level and the region-specific trend. This section starts with the analysis of factors
determining the initial level (1994) of inequality in a given region. Since we know that
regions are converging to some (common) inequality level, the current level can be
presented as ‘excess’ inequality in each region; that is, inequality compared to its long-
term trend value. Using this idea, the section seeks to explain the differences between
regions in their short-run deviations from the long-run inequality trends.
3.1 Inequality in the early transition years
As the process of regional convergence towards a common level of inequality operated in
1994-2000 rather slowly, a region’s observed level of inequality over the period was
clearly determined by the ‘initial’ (1994) values of the Gini index. What can explain why
certain regions had higher level of inequality than others?
Milanovic (1998) proposed a simple two-sector model to analyse drivers of inequality in
the early transition. Its values were calibrated to fit the generally observed patterns of
inequality dynamics in the pretransition period and immediately after the transition. The
parameters of the distribution were defined by the share of state sector employment, the
number of private sector workers (tagged as self-employed), the share of pensioners
(transfer recipients), their relative incomes and distribution within each ‘sector’. The
transition is modelled as a shrinking of the state sector accompanied by the emergence of
the private sector and an increase in the variation of incomes both across and within sectors
(part of which is determined through a state budget constraint). The latter factor, however,
is secondary and the key predictions of numerical experiments point to the direction of
intersectoral dynamics as key determinant of inequality change following transition.
Inequality may display considerable inertia, therefore one needs to control to the initial
pretransition inequality to allow pretransition parameters of the distribution to survive the
transition (such as the schedule of wage distribution in the state sector).
Unfortunately, almost none of the key parameters of this simple model can be directly
traced in Russian regional data. But some indirect measures can be helpful. What is
important is to catch in the model the factors determining (i) the size of the state sector and
the level of state sector workers (resources available to maintain employment and income
levels in the state sector), assuming that the distribution of incomes within the sector does
not change considerably; (ii) the size of the private sector, its relative income level and
changes in inequality within this sector (including its level of productivity, entry
conditions, etc.); and (iii) the number of transfer recipients. Since the parameters of the
distribution and the income level for the latter group are primarily defined at the national
level, it is enough simply to have a good measure of the size of this sector. Clearly, there
are complex interaction and simultaneity between all of these factors. For this reason, it is
important to include lagged values in the analysis of the current inequality levels.34
The transition model offers a useful taxonomy of factors driving inequality. The initial
level inequality is a product of initial geographic and economic conditions of a region, its
employment structure, productive endowments, and policies aimed for redistributing
incomes. The model to be estimated to assess the factors which determine the initial values
of inequality can be represented as:
Gini 1994 = F (initial conditions, employment structure, demography, infrastructure, geography)  (18)
A detailed discussion of regionally disaggregated data on various indicators and their links
to factors of inequality changes can be found in Annex III. It also explains the basic logic
behind including or excluding certain variables in regressions that follow.
Kolenikov and Shorrocks (2003) also use a rather ad hoc regression framework to establish
determinants of inequality in Russian regions in 1995. Specifications adopted in this paper
are quite close to their approach. However, our aims are different. We seek to establish the
relative importance of various factors, whereas Kolenikov and Shorrocks strive to increase
the share of the explained interregional variance to conduct full Shapley-Owen-Shorrocks
decompositions of poverty at the regional level.
For the first block of inherited parameters, this paper assumes that the ‘usual’ level of
inequality in the region can be proxied by the ratio of money incomes in 1985 to the
national mean, and by car ownership (the most unequally distributed asset under
socialism). Human capital available in the region (measured as percentage of the
population with higher education in 1990) has an influence on both the size of the private
sector (more skilled labour force presumably facilitates private sector development), its
relative income level, and the inequality of earnings distribution. But because the latter
factor can be inequality-reducing, the overall impact of this factor on inequality is hard to
predict. The share of workers in private firms in 1992 and the number of employed in
SMEs per 1,000 population in 1992 directly measure entrepreneurial climate and predict
the size of this sector by 1994. These two variables are likely to have a positive inequality-
increasing effect. However if the hypothesis about smaller private sectors (in 1992)
reflecting more hostile business environments40 is true, then smaller private sectors with
more risky (and thus significantly more unequal) incomes may push up inequality
compared to regions with larger private sectors and lower business risks and, thus, less
unequal incomes. Variables showing the number of person employed in industry in 1992
and the level of regional budget dependency on transfers from the central budget are both
linked to the exposure to transitional recession and reveal the downward trend in the state
sector. The higher these values, the more likely the region is to display some retardation in
the decompression of the distribution.
                                                
40 See Basareva (2002), and Earle and Sakova (1999).35
The variable measuring the level of demographic dependency rate aims at establishing the
size of the transfer recipients sector—one of the factors countervailing increases in
inequality. The higher the dependency rate, the lower inequality would be, other things
being equal. Another set of variables aims at capturing the levels of productivity, wages or
rents in the new private sector—road quality, telephone lines/population, index of natural
resources, and the prevalence of price controls (human capital also has a role here). The
higher the indicators, the higher inequality one may expect as the relative income level in
the private sector will be higher. Finally, the share of urban population, population density,
distance to Moscow, control for large regional (>800,000) capital, and the region’s share of
population residing in the five largest cities all act as controls for geographical conditions.
Kolenikov and Shorrocks (2003) also classify the variables of the model into large classes
such as natural resources, reform process, demographic, macroeconomic, politics, human
capital and geography. Each class includes three and more variables. The dependent
variable is the level of inequality 1995 by regions. Annex IV reports results of four
alternative specifications for the framework adopted in this paper: for population weighted
and unweighted regressions, and for the full set of regions as opposed to the sample
without Moscow, St Petersburg and Tuymen. The results show that all factors, where the
unambiguous assessment of expected influence on inequality can be made, have predicted
signs. A large industrial sector, higher reliance on central transfers, higher demographic
dependency rates in 1992, all reduce initial (1994) levels of inequality. The share of
workers employed by SMEs in 1992 is linked to higher inequality by 1994; however, this
effect is not robust to removal of the three regions from the distribution. The extent of price
controls in 1992 definitely contributed to higher inequality two years later.
It is informative to find out that proxies for ‘inherited’ inequality (level of income in 1985
and car ownership) have insignificant impact as determinants of inequality in transition. On
the other hand, a higher level of education seems to be one of the strongest and most
significant factors reducing inequality. Unexpectedly, the share of private sector in
employment by 1992 has an opposite sign compared to the share of SMEs; it tends to
reduce the level of inequality. It is likely that we see here an effect of rents discussed
above.
Most of the geography variables are either weak or insignificant. The natural resources,
however, acted quite strongly to reduce inequality, contrary to expectations. What is
observed here is, possibly, an indirect effect from more abundant natural resources through
local fiscal revenue leading to the greater affordability of redistribution. The regression
produces overall good fit and there is a consistency in the signs and size of estimated
coefficients across its modification. But it gives only a static view on the distribution.
3.2 Changes in inequality
To describe the factors behind the transitional dynamics, one needs a formal
representation, accounting for the role of each factor and the interplay between them.36
Following Aghion and Blanchard (1994), the key channels of redistribution in transition
can be formalized in a two-sector model in which the reallocation of labour and capital
across state and private sectors (and unemployment as a transient step between the two) is
seen as the determining feature of transition. The model is primarily concerned with the
labour allocation, labour incomes and transfers and, hence, can provide the paths (short-
and medium-term dynamics) of inequality and poverty over the transition. In a number of
modifications of the model some simulations were presented which provide a set of simple
benchmarks for understanding the size of likely effects from within-sector inequalities,
restructuring and closure probabilities for state firms and the relative productivity of both
state and private sectors.
The model produces a rich set of trajectories and paths depending on the key parameters;
unfortunately it does not have a formal solution that would allow the development of a
functional form for estimation. Simulations using versions of the model and their
applications to study cross-country variation are described in detail in Commander and
Tolstopiatenko (1996).41 The simulations show that short- and medium-term dynamics of
inequality are influenced by the dynamics of sectoral employment, differences in sectoral
productivity, and by the levels of inequality within each sector, all of which are
predetermined in the model. What is interesting is that within a general trend towards
rising inequality to its long-term steady state level, there are substantial variations in the
speed of such a movement across even a slight modification of parameter values. The path
depends on the specific parameters of production and investment functions in each sector,
but also on exogenously set probabilities of closure, and on taxation and benefit regime.
The path is also sensitive to the initial level of inequality.
Simulations using this model and a set of parameters show that raising unemployment
benefits results in a decrease in inequality. An increase in the probability of restructuring or
closure leads to an increase in inequality. The taxation level does not have a clear impact
on inequality under certain configuration of parameters, but does affect inequality, in other
settings.
3.3 Empirical results
Based on the insights provided by the restructuring model, this paper adopts a very
parsimonious specification for the empirical test. To empirically estimate the role of
various factors affecting regional inequality, the test will relate the current level (t) of the
                                                
41 The economy consists of two sectors, state and private, and three basic labour market states, state
employment, private employment and unemployment. The model assumes standard production functions and
a given distribution of workers by skills and productivities, as well as utility functions. It endogenizes the
decision of closure and restructuring by assuming that they depend on the difference between values of
staying in different sectors compared to the value of being unemployed and to the value of being in the
unrestructured firm. In addition a key parameter, probability of closure, is determined by exogenous
institutional and financial factors. There are also exogenously chosen policy parameters, such as taxation and
unemployment benefits, which makes this model somewhat less ‘closed’ than in the optimal taxation models
as analysed in Kanbur and Tuomala (2002) referred to in the previous section.37
Gini index to its initial ‘error free’ level, as well as to a number of factors which reveal the
speed of convergence to a (common) steady state. A large instrument matrix and panel data
are used, but no assumptions are made on the autocorrelation of residuals. The equation to
be estimated is now modified to include initial level of inequality G* (instrumented with a
set of variables described above), and time-variant policy parameters.
Ginit = F (G*, initial conditions, employment structure, demography, infrastructure, policies, geography) (19)
The results are presented in Table 6. Three estimators were used: the simple pooled OLS
regression with instruments, and two panel regression set-ups (the between estimator and
the random effect panel regressions). Most of the results are stable across methods. These
results suggest that regional current levels of inequality depend critically on the initial
conditions—the Gini index is strongly related to its initial level (instrumented to address
the measurement error issue),42 but this is not the only factor which determines the
observed level of regional inequality. The current economic conditions, expressed by the
unemployment rate, are the second key factor. It is related to inequality in a predictable
manner—the higher the unemployment rate, the stronger the level of inequality deviates
upwards from its initially set values, other factors being controlled for.
Policy related variables have predictable signs, but most of them are insignificant except
for communists being in charge of the legislature which does reduce the current level of
inequality, other things being equal. Price controls, which are normally associated with
attempts to reduce inequality, do not have an independently measurable impact on slowing
down the inequality changes. Regions which inherited larger industrial sectors have
persistently lower levels of inequality, again ceteris paribus. All variables characterizing the
business environment and the degree of restructuring have the right signs; they accelerate the
move to a higher inequality.
Governance of the public sector also matters for inequality. It may be surprising that higher
wage arrears act to reduce the level of inequality, but if one accepts the interpretation of
arrears to civil servants as a politically manipulated phenomenon used by regional
authorities to bargain more resources and transfers from the centre (see Treisman and
Gimpelson 2000; and Zhuravskaya 2000), then its role in hampering market forces is
consistent with negative effects on inequality. In a more narrow sense, transfers reduce
inequality, as one may expect.
                                                
42 Inequality convergence suggests that the coefficient for the initial level of inequality should be less than
one and greater than zero, which is the case in Table 6.38
Table 6: Factors determining current levels of inequality
OLS IV Random effect panel Between panel







Rsq: between 0.1896 0.0006
Within 0.6866 0.6877
Overall 0.5621 0.5763 0.5081
Wald test 162.28 0.000 122.58 0.000
Level of Gini in 1994 (instrumented) 0.560 0.114 0.000 0.596 0.183 0.001 0.767 0.206 0.000
Experience of current governor in office 0.002 0.002 0.145 0.002 0.002 0.369 0.001 0.003 0.686
Legislature controlled by communists -0.025 0.013 0.058 -0.030 0.021 0.159 -0.035 0.022 0.112
Price controls 0.000 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.000 0.178 0.000 0.000 0.246
Unemployment rate 0.397 0.125 0.002 0.352 0.120 0.003 0.560 0.288 0.052
Share of employed in industry -0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.005 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.059
Share of employed at SMEs 0.047 0.099 0.636 0.065 0.117 0.578 -0.088 0.194 0.652
Index of ownership restructuring -0.025 0.078 0.751 -0.021 0.129 0.871 0.010 0.131 0.940
Index of sectoral shifts in employment -0.472 0.148 0.002 -0.493 0.242 0.041 -0.512 0.250 0.041
Openness to trade 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.271 0.012 0.014 0.090
Wage arrears to civil servants -0.143 0.044 0.001 -0.192 0.037 0.000 0.109 0.153 0.474
State transfers as share of population
income
-0.176 0.102 0.086 -0.180 0.122 0.142 -0.194 0.195 0.321









Estimations presented in this section are aimed to measure the impact of various economic
fundamentals on the path of inequality convergence. The result looks consistent with the
models of restructuring and suggests that inequality dynamics is determined by a complex
combination of many factors, which all determine how fast the regions move to a
distribution determined by market forces and fundamentals. But the fact that it occurs in all
parts of Russia, and that even the least advanced reformers also move in the same
direction, albeit slowly, shows the broad-based nature of on-going reforms.
4 Conclusions
A recent debate around poverty and inequality demonstrated the crucial importance of
good quality comprehensive data covering sufficiently long periods of time to underpin the
analysis. This is exactly where the information on Russian regions remains scarce and
largely not up to the task. Despite these limitations, the analysis of data from HBS sheds
light on many issues of regional dynamics pertaining to the socioeconomic impact of the
Russian transition. It is especially relevant to discern tendencies suggested by this
particular dataset, as it is effectively a mirror in which Russian politics is reflected—that of
official statistics.
This study finds that the share of inequality in Russia coming from within its regions is
dominant, but unlike in other countries in Europe where it accounts for 90-95 per cent of
the total inequality, in Russia its share is 70 per cent. Inequality between regions is
growing over time, and accounts for 85 per cent of the increase in the national inequality
over 1994-2000. The analysis suggests that, on the one hand, the regions seem to exhibit
divergence in per capita incomes (especially over 1997-2000), but, on the other hand, they
converge in their inequality levels (to a common value of Gini index around 0.35).
Projections show that if observed trends are to continue into the future, by 2010 the
absolute majority (56 per cent) of Russia’s poor will be concentrated in a few permanently
impoverished regions (with incomes below 90 per cent of the national average), while
relatively more affluent regions will become virtually free of poverty.
The paper shows that rather large observed differences between regions in their current
levels of inequality can be traced to a set of economic, political and geographic factors that
determine the evolution of income distribution. Over time the ‘inherited’ factors play lesser
roles, and the labour market situation emerges as a particularly important factor of the
inequality dynamics.
This paper is by far not the final word in economic studies of Russian regional dynamics.
Economic fundamentals, especially those related to the rate of technological progress, need
to be properly revealed before one attempts further to understand the regional convergence
or divergence in Russia. The relevance of conclusions from the analysis of data presented
in this paper, however, depends on the validity of assumptions underlying data processing
techniques used by Goskomstat, some of which, as shown in the literature, are40
controversial. A recent study by Mistiaen and Ravallion (2002) argues that measures of
inequality depend crucially on the assumptions about the behaviour regarding participation
in the survey. A thorough reassessment of results has to rely on the raw data. The recently
initiated joint Russian government-DFID-World Bank project aims at putting the data in
the public domain, thus one can hope that significant advances in understanding the nature
and dynamics of inequality in transition will be made in the near future.41
Annex I: Definition of regions
By 1992 there were 73 statistically distinct units in the Russian Federation (72 without
Chechnya, which stopped co-operation on statistical matters rather early). According to the
hierarchy accepted after the break up, and prior to the adoption of the new constitutions,
Russian statistics and politics comprised 77 oblasts, krais, and republics (without Chechnya).
The difference between 72 and 77 is due to the fact that several republics of North Caucasus
Adygeya and Karachaevo-Cherkessiya were not earlier covered by regular statistical
monitoring, and by very late (1992) granting of the status of ‘subject’ of the Russian
Federation to three Siberian regions (Altai, Evreiskaya, and Chukotskij). The definition of
regions has again changed in the new constitution to represent subjects of the federation,
numbering 89 territorial units.
The federative structure of the Russian federation as it emerged in the new constitution is
somewhat peculiar. It consists of 89 politically equal federation members, including 21
republics (national-territorial entities), 55 krais and oblasts (administrative-territorial entities),
two cities of federal significance, Moscow and St Petersburg, and eleven smaller okrugs and
oblasts (autonomous national-territorial entities). Previously autonomous okrugs and oblasts,
for statistical purposes, were considered as part of the respective krais or oblasts, but after
adoption of the new constitution they are on par with other members. Goskomstat did not
respond to these changes immediately, but starting in 199943 all information published referred
to 89 federation subjects (88 in practice, as there were no data on Chechnya). No data,
however, exists for autonomous okrugs and oblasts prior to 1999. The introduction of federal
okrugs in 2000 changed the groupings of regions again, but confirmed and reinforced the equal
treatment of all 89 regions for statistical purposes.44 However, the total number of
economically distinct regions for the entire period is narrower as earlier data were available
only for a classification of 77 regions (and 72 regions prior to 1992).
A region represents a meaningful aggregation level for the purposes of inequality analysis. In
addition to similar geographic, historic and social conditions, regions are the agents of fiscal,
structural and social policy. They have the right to levy local taxes, invest in local
infrastructure, provide subsidies to enterprises, legislate on local social transfers, supplement
federally mandated transfers, and provide housing and utility subsidies to the households. At
the same time authorities in some regions employ several quasi-legal methods of impeding free
movement of capital, goods, services and labour. There is a wealth of data published for each
of the regions. Understanding the true meaning of some of the published data, presented in this
table, does require a special description of methodological issues, provided in Annex III.
                                                
43 Goskomstat (1999).
44 Data published from the 1997 HBS was in line with the new member-level groupings (again, in practice
88 regions).42
Annex II
Table A1: Transition matrices for regions between income states
A: Year-to-year: distribution dynamics: average of one-year transitions between 1994 and 2000 (six 1-year transitions)
2000 position (class of income) Income intervals (per capita incomes to
poverty lines) <0.7 0.7-0.9 0.9-1.1 1.1-1.3 >1.3
<0.7 0.78 0.20 0.02 0.00 0.00
 0.7- 0.9 0.12 0.69 0.18 0.01 0.00
0.9-1.1 0.00 0.19 0.60 0.20 0.01
1.1-1.3 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.51 0.10
1994 position
(class of income)
>1.3 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.21 0.76
Starting frequency (regions in each class in 1994) 0.11 0.30 0.33 0.18 0.08
Ending frequency (regions in each class in 2000) 0.12 0.29 0.33 0.18 0.08
Ergodic Distribution 0.17 0.30 0.30 0.16 0.07
B: Three-year average: distribution dynamics between 1994 and 2000 (two 3-year transitions)
Position at the completion of transitions (class of income) Income intervals
(per capita incomes to poverty lines) <0.7 0.7-0.9 0.9-1.1 1.1-1.3 >1.3
<0.7 0.69 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00
 0.7- 0.9 0.14 0.53 0.25 0.08 0.00
0.9-1.1 0.06 0.26 0.49 0.15 0.04
1.1-1.3 0.00 0.08 0.42 0.33 0.17
Starting position
(class of income)
>1.3 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.31 0.54
Starting frequency (regions in each class in 1994) 0.08 0.33 0.34 0.16 0.08
Ending frequency (regions in each class in 2000) 0.12 0.31 0.32 0.16 0.08
Ergodic distribution 0.19 0.32 0.28 0.13 0.07
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Predictions of dynamics based on transition matrix models
C: Actual distribution dynamics between 1994 and 2000 (actual initial and final positions)
2000 position (class of income) Income intervals (regional per capita money
incomes to regional poverty line) <0.7 0.7-0.9 0.9-1.1 1.1-1.3 >1.3
<0.7 0.67 0.17 0.00 0.17 0.00
 0.7- 0.9 0.19 0.41 0.26 0.15 0.00
0.9-1.1 0.08 0.40 0.28 0.12 0.12
1.1-1.3 0.00 0.18 0.45 0.18 0.18
1994 position
(class of income)
>1.3 0.13 0.00 0.38 0.13 0.38
D. Predicted distribution dynamics from six 1-year transitions between 1994 and 2000
2000 position (class of income) Income intervals (per capita incomes to
poverty lines) <0.7 0.7-0.9 0.9-1.1 1.1-1.3 >1.3
<0.7 0.45 0.36 0.14 0.03 0.00
 0.7- 0.9 0.21 0.40 0.27 0.10 0.02
0.9-1.1 0.07 0.27 0.39 0.21 0.07
1.1-1.3 0.02 0.18 0.41 0.27 0.14
1994 position
(class of income)
>1.3 0.00 0.06 0.26 0.29 0.40
E: Predicted distribution dynamics from two 3-year transitions between 1994 and 2000
2000 position (class of income) Income intervals (per capita incomes to
poverty lines) <0.7 0.7-0.9 0.9-1.1 1.1-1.3 >1.3
<0.7 0.52 0.38 0.08 0.02 0.00
 0.7- 0.9 0.19 0.40 0.29 0.11 0.02
0.9-1.1 0.11 0.30 0.37 0.16 0.07
1.1-1.3 0.04 0.19 0.38 0.23 0.16
1994 position
(class of income)




Annex III: Variables for regional analysis of the inequality convergence
Variables used to characterize factors of inequality levels are as follows.
A3.1 Endowments and initial conditions of the regions
To characterize natural resource endowments we use a complex assessment score
developed by Lavrov, which in addition to mineral resources includes also data on climatic
conditions, soils etc. Alternatively, a simple dummy for the eight richest regions in terms
of minerals is used.
To characterize population age profile (and labour resources available) we use
demographic dependency rate (the sum of those below and above working age to total
population). We also look at changes during 1985-95. Regions differ quite a lot, from 0.47
dependant for one person of working age up to 0.90. Changes in the demographic burden
differ from 0 to 12 per cent increase. None of the regions witnessed a decrease in this rate.
Capital size is reported to be an important factor identified in the literature (see Fedorov
2002) as a good proxy for the opportunity for agglomeration, scale economies,
concentration of wealth and therefore inequality.
Measures of education at the regional level are very poorly reported by statistical agencies.
The latest available published information refers to micro census.
Physical assets are difficult to measure. The existing accounting method does not
adequately capture the market value, etc. We approximate this endowment by the share of
employment in industry.
To characterize the state of the infrastructure we use two proxies. ‘Road quality’ is the per
cent of all roads that are paved; the latest available figures for 1995 give regional
variations between 59.2 per cent to 100 per cent. The second is an infrastructure proxy: the
density of telephone lines (urban only); regionally density varies tremendously from 9 to
193 telephone lines per 100 urban families.
A3.2 Restructuring policies: advanced reformers versus lagged regions
The paper identifies two groups of factors: proxies for ‘quality of policies’ that determine
the investment climate, and the measures of the business climate.
A number of policy-related indicators are available for Russian regions, such as the
dominant party in the parliament, the political orientation of governors, the number of
governors since the start of transition, the experience of ruling governors etc. One of the
key indicators of governance at the regional level is an early start in the privatization45
process. By 1995, the total share of productive assets in mixed, private or foreign
ownership varied between regions from a low of 7 per cent to a high of 94 per cent (with
an average of around 50 per cent). The list of lagging regions corresponds well with the
known group of regions lead by conservative (communist) governments opposed to market
reforms. A completely different though plausible proxy for governance quality can be
fiscal data. Many scholars agree that wage arrears were a major sign of the breakdown of
state authority in Russia. One can argue that wage arrears to civil servants can have
especially detrimental consequences and reflect quite closely the degree of disorganization
in the provision of basic state services. As measured by this indicator, regions ranged in
1997 between zero (no arrears) to 25 per cent of the annual wage bill owed to civil servants
as unpaid wages (with a national average of 3 per cent). In 1998 the situation deteriorated
dramatically with 17 per cent of the total wage bill owed, with a peak of 45 per cent
(implying that in some regions wages have been almost half a year late). The year 1999
saw a dramatic improvement with the national average standing at 1.3 per cent (with a high
of 35 per cent).
Development of SMEs is a clear outcome indicator for governance quality reflecting the
investment climate. Russian statistics of SMEs, which rely on surveys or census-type
registration, is quite problematic especially where the dynamic story and comparisons over
time are concerned—but as a measure of regional ranking it is quite acceptable. We use the
share of SME employment to total employment measured by Goskomstat as a more
reliable indicator of the real importance of SMEs (compared to sales or the number of
firms, which seems to be particularly biased). The most business-friendly Russian regions
in 1996 had a high of 40 per cent of all workforce employed by SMEs (average of 12), but
in the worst regions this index was below 3 per cent. We also use the per capita number of
SMEs in 1992 to control for the initial entrepreneurial abilities of the population. Basareva
(2002) in her study of regional aspects of SME development revealed two significant facts:
links of entry to self-employment and SMEs to the entrepreneurial climate in the region
(broadly defined); and links of entry to the level and dispersion of entrepreneurial incomes.
She demonstrates that the level of SME development in 1992 reflected some general local
preferences and largely predetermined the evolution of the sector in transition.
The dispersion of FDI share across regions in the gross regional product is, as one expects,
exceptionally high but only a handful of regions have received substantial investments.
Openness to trade is a better proxy for the overall effort of the regional government to
integrate into the market economy. The ranking of regions according to this indicator has
remained very stable over time. There are also all sorts of measurement problems (place of
registration of import and export firms is different from the origin/final destination, etc.).
Thus, the Republic of Ingushetia (with a special tax regime) serves clearly as a tax haven
for many such firms, having a sum of export and import exceeding six times its regional
gross product. The lowest share of around 2 per cent is registered in the Siberian Tuva
Republic. However, as a general tendency this share is an informative indicator of both46
firms’ and regional authorities’ efforts to facilitate international trade and can therefore be
used alongside other policy proxies.
An index of structural change (the sum of changes in the sectoral shares of employment)
was originally proposed by Layard et al. (1991) in the analysis of unemployment. This
index seems to perform well in assessing the depth of industrial restructuring by a certain
date.
A3.3 Economic shocks
Regions were exposed to different shocks depending on their output composition. These
shocks clearly influenced the transitional dynamics of inequality. Unemployment and
employment rates as measured by the labour force survey (LFS) can be used to identify the
magnitude of shocks to regional employment. Regions differ quite substantially in these
indices; the unemployment rate in 1998 ranged from 5 to 50 per cent.
A3.4 Transfers: main types, role, variation across regions; transfer dependent versus
transfer independent
We distinguish two types of transfers: budgetary transfers to regions; and transfers from
regional budgets to populations. On average, a Russian region receives around 20 per cent
of its spending budget from the federal budget as an interbudgetary transfer, with a low of
only 3 per cent and a high of 90 per cent. The share of social public transfers in total
population income varies in response to regional social policies and the demographic
structure of the population, to produce a rather wide range between 5 and 31 per cent
during 1997-99.47
Annex IV
Table A2: Instrumental variables regressions for the initial level of inequality (Gini index in 1994), regression results










F(22, 52) 4.07 F(22, 52) 11.23 F( 22, 50) 2.71 F( 22,    50) 3.22
Prob > F 0 Prob > F 0 Prob > F 0.0018 Prob > F 0.0003
R2 0.6328 R2 0.8261 R2 0.5437 R2 0.5861
Adj R2 0.4775 Adj R2 0.7525 Adj R2 0.3429 Adj R2 0.404
Root MSE 0.04419 Root MSE 0.0349 Root MSE 0.04428 Root MSE 0.03559
Dependent variable is:
Gini for real money incomes in 1994 coef. std. err. t coef. std. err t coef. std. err t coef. std. err. t
Mon. inc. in 1985 to national average -0.0180 0.0125 -1.4420 -0.0189 0.0126 -1.5020 -0.0189 0.0126 -1.5020 -0.0126 0.0113 -1.1140
Car ownership in 1990 (per 1,000
pop.)
-0.0002 0.0005 -0.5120 -0.0005 0.0004 -1.2880 -0.0003 0.0005 -0.5930 -0.0005 0.0004 -1.1030
% of population with high ed., 1990 -0.5552 0.1815 -3.0580 -0.3047 0.1687 -1.8070 -0.5464 0.1887 -2.8960 -0.2351 0.1753 -1.3410
Share of workers in priv. firms, 1992 -0.3982 0.1807 -2.2040 -0.3223 0.1818 -1.7730 -0.4044 0.1813 -2.2310 -0.3145 0.1829 -1.7200
SME per 1,000 pop., 1992 0.0115 0.0032 3.6510 0.0110 0.0025 4.4640 0.0083 0.0042 1.9980 0.0068 0.0052 1.3090
Employed in industry, pop. 1992 -0.8191 0.2467 -3.3200 -0.7859 0.2080 -3.7790 -0.7255 0.2590 -2.8010 -0.7037 0.2152 -3.2690
High dependency on budget transfers -0.0243 0.0179 -1.3580 -0.0142 0.0148 -0.9590 -0.0215 0.0182 -1.1780 -0.0104 0.0150 -0.6940
Middle dependency on budget
transfers
-0.0542 0.0217 -2.5020 -0.0413 0.0193 -2.1460 -0.0589 0.0220 -2.6780 -0.0465 0.0197 -2.3620
Score for price controls, max. =1 0.1108 0.0326 3.4030 0.0898 0.0308 2.9120 0.0951 0.0368 2.5850 0.0707 0.0349 2.0260
Relative price level, to average Russia -0.0582 0.0269 -2.1640 -0.0645 0.0249 -2.5860 -0.0632 0.0274 -2.3090 -0.0676 0.0254 -2.6640
Middle level of demographic
dependency rate
-0.0456 0.0216 -2.1120 -0.0358 0.0181 -1.9730 -0.0500 0.0221 -2.2630 -0.0389 0.0185 -2.1030
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High level of demographic
dependency rate
-0.0515 0.0271 -1.8990 -0.0400 0.0243 -1.6480 -0.0553 0.0278 -1.9880 -0.0426 0.0249 -1.7130
Middle level of road quality 0.0250 0.0151 1.6500 0.0227 0.0131 1.7240 0.0223 0.0155 1.4440 0.0185 0.0134 1.3760
High level of road quality 0.0264 0.0159 1.6640 0.0267 0.0137 1.9500 0.0263 0.0160 1.6470 0.0249 0.0137 1.8200
Middle level of telephone
lines/population
-0.0084 0.0142 -0.5910 -0.0147 0.0128 -1.1510 -0.0069 0.0144 -0.4830 -0.0111 0.0130 -0.8590
High level of telephone
lines/population
-0.0212 0.0150 -1.4090 -0.0109 0.0132 -0.8300 -0.0174 0.0154 -1.1300 -0.0055 0.0136 -0.4010
Share of urban population 0.1259 0.0914 1.3780 0.1259 0.0820 1.5350 0.0905 0.0958 0.9450 0.1019 0.0835 1.2200
Population density 0.0000 0.0002 0.0830 0.0000 0.0001 -0.4140 0.0000 0.0002 -0.1560 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.4950
Index of natural resources -0.0373 0.0195 -1.9110 -0.0199 0.0172 -1.1530 -0.0400 0.0197 -2.0290 -0.0240 0.0178 -1.3500
Distance to Moscow 0.0000 0.0017 0.0250 -0.0011 0.0016 -0.6900 0.0007 0.0018 0.4190 -0.0005 0.0016 -0.2920
Dummy for large (>800 thousand)
capital
0.0073 0.0159 0.4580 0.0046 0.0122 0.3780 0.0119 0.0163 0.7300 0.0082 0.0124 0.6620
Share of reg. pop. in 5 largest cities -0.1128 0.0911 -1.2390 -0.0895 0.0833 -1.0750 -0.1319 0.0931 -1.4170 -0.1146 0.0849 -1.3500
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